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Carlo Maria Cantore

*“How Does it Feel to Be on Your Own?”*  
Mutual Recognition Agreements and  
Non Discrimination in the GATS: a  
*‘Third Parties’* Perspective

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Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies  
Department of Law  
<http://stals.sssup.it>

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**Mutual Recognition Agreements and Non Discrimination in the  
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**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to analyse the consistency of two relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Art. VII GATS allows a Member to recognise (mutually or unilaterally) the standards of one or more members without violating its obligations under the WTO. The second is the general Non Discrimination principle, as it is expressed in Art. II GATS. By looking at all the MRAs notified to the WTO Secretariat under Art. VII.2 GATS, I tried to assess whether the ‘non-discriminatory MRAs’ concept is a contradiction in terms or not, and how the openness mechanisms provided by the treaty are working. Both theory and practice demonstrate how hard is for a third party to join a pre-existent MRA. The MRAs’ landscape is another proof of the general trends towards regionally integrated markets, while the idea of a global trade liberalisation seems to be in crisis.

**Key-words**

WTO, GATS, Mutual Recognition, Preferential Treatment Agreements, Non Discrimination

**“How Does it Feel to Be on Your Own?”**  
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### **Introduction**

The aim of this working paper is to analyze the compatibility between two relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the World Trade Organization. The first is Art. VII (*Recognition*), which seems to allow a Member to recognize standards of one or more Members (and not of others) without violating its GATS obligations, although this freedom should not be abused. The second is the general ‘Non Discrimination’ provision as of Art. II GATS, since the aim of the GATS, at least as it reads in its preamble, is to provide a multilateral framework to trade liberalization in the services market on a non discriminatory basis. Through the following pages, I will try to explain the rationale to sign Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and their impact on the GATS system. In particular, it is interesting to understand how third parties can be affected and/or can react (economically and legally) to such agreements. It is true that there is a general

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\* Undergraduate student, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa, [c.cantore@sssup.it](mailto:c.cantore@sssup.it) During the whole research, I had the honour and the pleasure to benefit of the patient and encouraging supervision of Prof. Petros Mavroidis. By attending his classes and collaborating to a research project with him, I discovered a new way to look at the ‘law in action’ and to deal with the problems of market regulation. At the WTO headquarters, my research could have been much harder without the help and the suggestions I received by Dr. Juan Marchetti. I want to thank them both, because they made me feel as I was working ‘with’ them, and not just ‘for’ them. All opinions and errors are my own. Neuchâtel, May 2009.

principle of transparency and openness of the MRAs, but we need to get our hands dirty with the reality and understand if and how such an *openness clause* works.

The most important part of my research was that of checking all the MRAs, the Unilateral Recognition provisions (under Art. VII.4 GATS) and the PTAs (under Art. V GATS) notified to the WTO secretariat, and the results of this work are, in some cases, unexpected.

In the next pages I am going to describe the results of my research both from a doctrinal and an empirical standpoint. In the first part of this work, I am going to analyze the legal provisions of the WTO system (GATS) regarding Mutual Recognition. First I will describe Art. VII, how it works, and its relationship with the general ND (non discrimination) provision under Art. II GATS.

Second I will analyze the *openness clause* under Art. VII.2 GATS, which is a legal provision that grants the right for third parties to demonstrate that they are in a comparable situation to the one of the MRAs' partners, in order to negotiate their accession. Also if a Member decides, autonomously, to grant recognitions, it should respect the openness clause and allow any other interested party to demonstrate that:

(...) education, experience, licenses, or certifications obtained or requirements met in that other Member's territory should be recognized

Third I will provide information about all the 106 bilateral MRAs, the 16 plurilateral MRAs and the 12 Unilateral Recognition provisions notified so far under Art. VII.2 (until May 2009) using different parameters. Then I will check whether some of the Preferential Treatment Agreements (PTAs) notified under Art. V GATS contain MRAs (in this section I will expand the definition of MRAs to include MRA-type of provisions as well).

This work is based on a research inquiry I made from February to May 2009 at the WTO headquarters in Geneva, under the supervision of Prof. Petros Mavroidis and Dr. Juan Marchetti.

## 1. Mutual Recognition Agreements from theory to practice

### 1.1 A brief survey on the notion and history of Mutual Recognition

It could be useful to start with a definition of the Mutual Recognition concept, in order to better organize the work. From now on, I will refer to Mutual Recognition, as it was defined by Nicolaïdis (2000): ‘Mutual recognition establishes the general principle that if a product or a service can be sold lawfully in one jurisdiction, it can be sold freely in any other participating jurisdiction, without having to comply with the regulations of these other jurisdictions’. Governments usually adopt mutual recognition as a contractual norm, in order to become reciprocally obliged to transfer (partially or completely) regulatory authority from the host jurisdiction<sup>1</sup> (where a commercial transaction takes place), to the home jurisdiction (from which a person or a service originate).

Under the Mutual Recognition’s umbrella, we can find agreements that deal with the ‘equivalence’, ‘compatibility’ or, at least ‘acceptability’ of the counterpart’s regulatory system.

Mutual Recognition found general application in the context of the European integration. Many scholars usually write that it was a judicial creation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in its famous ‘*Cassis de Dijon*’ judgment (1979). But the concept was first included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Art. 57.1 of the Treaty of Rome provides the basis for future Directives on mutual recognition of diplomas and professional licences. Notwithstanding a huge legislative effort in order to pull down barriers and to encourage the market’s harmonization, no big goals were reached until the early 80s<sup>2</sup>. The 1985 White Paper (*Completing the internal market*), was the pathfinder to encourage a new approach to the harmonization of the market, essentially based on a ‘managed mutual recognition approach’<sup>3</sup>. It was only after the White Paper that the EC’s

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<sup>1</sup> I prefer to use the word ‘jurisdiction’ rather than the word ‘country’, because, as a consequence of the European integrations, the former ‘Westphalian equilibrium’ seems to have disappeared in the ‘old continent’, leaving the stage to a new emerging actor.

<sup>2</sup> Scholars usually refer to the Cassis judgement as the first case of Mutual Recognition because, while Art. 57 of the Treaty of Rome represents a call for legislative actions which may or may not take place, in the case before the European Court of Justice, such a concept was imposed to all trade in goods .

<sup>3</sup> ‘(...) managed mutual recognition can be viewed in a static or in a dynamic manner. (...) Dynamically, mutual recognition can be viewed as a process, involving implicit or explicit trade-

market in services switched from a situation where the aim was just that of harmonize the conditions for access, to another new one, where the aim became that of pursuing the creation of a general system of recognition of higher education diplomas. The idea behind was that the EC member states should arrive to a situation where services and goods suppliers are proved to be subject to adequate controls in their states of origin, no further controls should be required by the states in which the services and the goods are provided.

It was not, however, just a European topic. Also in the international context there has been a long and multifaceted series of bilateral or multilateral agreements providing mutual recognition in services. For example, and in order to better understand how far back we can look while discussing about MRAs in services, we know that the ‘Convenio of Montevideo’, signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, dates to 1889. Such agreements started to be frequent, during the XXth Century, among parties sharing the same language or the same region (both, very often), or having strong cultural links<sup>4</sup>. The most active region in this field was Latin America.

Within the framework of these agreements, the parties usually provided recognition to academic and professional diplomas obtained in the other country, due to the reciprocal trust regarding to strong similarities between educational and training programs in general.

At the bilateral level, there have also been cases of MRAs in different sectors. Beviglia Zampetti (2000) provides for an interesting overview of the agreements previous to the Uruguay Round. Just to give some examples, it is worth to mention: the 1989 agreement between the European Community and Switzerland on ‘direct insurance other than life insurance’, in order to create identical conditions to access to direct insurance activities<sup>5</sup>; the bilateral agreements that Germany signed with Japan and the United States of America in order to provide exemption from some German Banking Act’s provisions (credit limits...) to credit

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offs between these dimensions to accommodate the ‘supply side’ (for example, regulators’ requirements) that may change over time. The more parties are aware of these potential trade-offs, the higher the likelihood that they will reach agreement and devise solutions acceptable to all’. Nicolaidis and Shaffer (2005)

<sup>4</sup> See Part 2

<sup>5</sup> See the agreement between EC and the Swiss Confederation on direct insurance other than life insurance, in *OJEC* (Official Journal of the European Communities) L 205, July 27, 1991. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 1993.

institutions established in its territory, although they have their registered office in the other two countries' territory.

There's been also something in the multilateral context. See for example the efforts made by UNESCO and the Council of Europe in recognition of educational qualifications.

At the end of this brief and far from being exhaustive list, it is worth recalling that MRAs are not just governmental practices. In the context of Commonwealth, most of all, there has been a significant number of arrangements signed by professional bodies of accountants, engineers, architects etc. These bodies, however, benefit from public fiat from the governments to exercise legislative authority in narrow fields.

MRAs refer to different practices: it could be the case of recognition of the validity of diploma in order to enter the job market, or to facilitate the movement of students and scholars, or the circulation of financial services and so on and so forth. Most of them are signed bilaterally by state governments, but it can also be the case of multilateral agreements or agreements signed by professional associations. The identity of the signing body (governments or professional bodies specifically authorized to commit) influences the legal nature of such agreements: in principle, they are binding irrespective of the identity of the signing body, if they can still be considered intergovernmental agreements.

But when professional bodies have not an *ad hoc* authorization, it seems plausible to view them as private contracts. Nevertheless, sometimes these MRAs (particularly those under the NAFTA framework) explicitly stipulate that they are to be put in practice by local authorities when they are competent. It is hard not to agree with Beviglia Zampetti (2000a), when he says: 'These voluntary implementation activities appear to be unilateral acts that could be reversed without engendering any kind of legal responsibility. At most, a contractual engagement of a private nature could be identified'.

At any rate, since the WTO is a government to government contract, this question is moot for the rest of the paper.

## 1.2 Mutual Recognition in the WTO and, particularly, in the GATS

Article VII of the GATS is an attempt to deal in an original and consistent manner with a difficult balance. At first eye-sight, it seems to have two faces. On the one hand, Art. VII.1 reads:

For the purposes of the fulfilment, in whole or in part, of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers, and subject to the requirements of paragraph 3, a Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country. Such recognition, which may be achieved through harmonization or otherwise, may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with the country concerned or may be accorded autonomously.

This provision could be seen as the ‘authorization’ to a WTO member to recognize the standards of another member without violating the GATS ND principle. However Art. VII.2, contrary to Art. V of the same agreement (Regional Integration), leads to an *openness clause*. That means, as we mentioned above<sup>6</sup>, that MRAs’ partners are obliged to transparency and should not use mutual recognition as a discriminatory barrier against third parties.

These provisions seem to encourage a multilateral approach to mutual recognition, by exhorting the parties of bilateral and plurilateral MRAs to keep them open to the possibility of other entries.

A Member can, however, grant recognition autonomously, in accordance with Art. VII.4 GATS. In doing this, it shall not discriminate between ‘like services’ or ‘like service suppliers’ or introduce hidden<sup>7</sup> restrictions on trade in services. A question then arises, with respect to the agreements signed by professional associations. Since they are not governments, someone could argue that they are not obliged to respect the opening clause, and that they could keep those agreements closed to third parties. As far as Art. VII GATS applies only to governments, it is however important to notice that Art. I.3 GATS, which is likely a general principle that applies to all the other GATS provisions, obliges the governments to take ‘all reasonable measures’ to ensure compliance with the

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<sup>6</sup> See Introduction

<sup>7</sup> The text of Art. VII.3 reads ‘disguised’



Agreement also by non-governmental bodies<sup>8</sup> (to the extent, of course, that a government has constitutional powers to impose such a behaviour).

## 2. An empiric survey of the MRAs: how do the openness mechanisms work?

### 2.1 General Observations

Despite the ‘transparency clause’ provided in the Agreement, it was not easy to find all the Mutual Recognition Agreements in the notifications to the WTO. In fact, most of the countries notifying the agreements, usually make reference to their official contact points in order to make all the information (and, presumably, at least the texts of the treaties) accessible to the public. After checking on the WTO documents’ database, it is through contacts with the notifying Members that access to the full texts of the MRAs and, if possible, the implementation of the agreements<sup>9</sup> has been ensured in this study.

TABLE 1 – Contact Points

Parties	Email address provided*	Contacted last time	Answer
Argentina	Y	27/04/2009	NO
Armenia	Y	27/04/2009	NO
Australia	Y	27/04/2009	NO
Brazil	Y	27/04/2009	Undeliverable mail
Chile	Y	27/04/2009	Undeliverable mail
Colombia	N		-
Costa Rica	N		-
Cuba	Y	27/04/2009	Impossible to receive message from outside Cuba
El Salvador	Y	27/04/2009	NO

<sup>8</sup> Art. I.3 (a) GATS (Scope and Definitions): ‘(...) each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by regional and local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory (...)’

<sup>9</sup> I made reference to the official ‘contact points’ list of the WTO Secretariat

European Commission	Y	27/04/2009	NO
EU – Germany	Y	27/04/2009	No idea of how to get other information than that sent to the WTO secretariat
Guatemala	Y	27/04/2009	NO
Japan	N		-
Latvia	Y	27/04/2009	They sent the full texts of both the MRAs
Liechtenstein	N		-
Macau	Y	27/04/2009	NO
Norway	Y	27/04/2009	They sent the full text of the agreement
Singapore	Y	27/04/2009	No idea of how to get other information than that sent to the WTO secretariat
Switzerland	Y	27/04/2009	No idea of how to get other information than that sent to the WTO secretariat
USA	N		They submitted the full texts to the WTO secretariat
Venezuela	Y	27/04/2009	Undeliverable mail

\* In some cases, the parties provided just phone numbers. Those parties were not contacted.

At this point, we can analyze the most important tendencies in MRAs. The Members were obliged to notify also the Agreements they signed before the entry

into force of the GATS, and not just the ones signed after 1995 (see Art. VII.4 GATS). What we can say, is that there is not a cause – effect relationship between the provisions of the GATS and an increase of the number of MRAs.

As regarding the parties that have been more active in the signing of such agreements, we can definitely say that Latin American countries played a major role in this field, followed by English speaking countries. As regarding the subject matters, the majority of the agreements are about recognition of academic diplomas (53% of the total) while, in the field of recognition of professional licences (37%), accountants and engineers are the most covered qualifications. The remaining 10% is composed by agreements whose subject matter is unclear or whose provisions are about both academic diplomas and professional licences. SEE TABLE 2 – Subject Matter<sup>10</sup>.

## 2.2 How much trust affects trade in services

By looking at the final statistics about the entire work, there is something that comes immediately to the eye.

In the last decades a huge economic literature flourished about the relationship between ‘trust’ among parties<sup>11</sup> and the levels of market’s shares and capital flows. To describe what the word ‘trust’ mean in economic exchanges, we can make reference to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (forthcoming) when they state that ‘this trust is affected not only by objective characteristics of the country being trusted, but also by cultural aspects (...)’. In their paper they estimate and try to explain the relative levels of trust across different nations. In so doing, they reveal a relationship between the presence of the same cultural aspects (religion, legal order, educational system, history of wars, colonial history) and the level of trust among commercial partners, and they show evidence of how much this affects trade. Albeit the paper focuses on individuals, it seems that the same theory can be applied in a government-to-government framework like the WTO system

There are many other factors that can deal with the issue of trust among parties. In our research, since it was not possible to deal with all the possible factors, we decided to analyze the MRAs notified under Art. VII.4 GATS to check whether

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<sup>10</sup> Annex I

<sup>11</sup> See, for example: Becker (1957), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), Bonhorst, Ichino, Schlag and Winder (2004),

they were signed among parties sharing the same language or the same geographical region. As it is demonstrated (SEE TABLE 3 – Cultural Biases<sup>12</sup>), MRAs are signed essentially by countries with strong cultural similarities: 72% of these agreements are signed by countries that are also part of the same geographic region and 64% by countries speaking the same language<sup>13</sup>. If we combine these two parameters, we arrive to an amazing result: the 85% of all the MRAs is signed between partners that share either the same language, or the same geographical region<sup>14</sup>. This is a strong proof of the fact that, parallel to the so called phenomenon of ‘globalization’, there has been a constant growth of regionally based market integrations.

Apart from the ‘cultural biases’, that remain a strong factor in the choice of the commercial partners, another big issue addresses the will to mutually recognize academic and professional qualifications in order to develop the trade in services among the parties. We are referring to the ‘level of income’ of the countries involved in MRAs.

By using the ‘World Bank – List of economies’<sup>15</sup>, we divided the countries in G2 (EU and United States), HIC (High Income Countries), LIC (Low Income Countries), UMC (Upper Middle Income Countries), LMC (Lower Middle Income Countries) and LDC (Least Developed Countries). As it is shown in TABLE 4 – Level of income<sup>16</sup>, the 59.4% of the total of MRAs is signed between countries with a homogeneous background as for the level of income. In particular, if we horizontally sum the number of the MRAs signed between Middle Income Countries, we arrive at the surprising percentage of 55.66% over the all 106 agreements. This again, is a proof of how much ‘trust’ among parties affects the possibility of such agreements and, more generally, the levels of trade in services, and that this is not merely a cultural issue, but it involves also explanations provided by the economic background of the parties that decide to bind them with a MRA.

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<sup>12</sup> Annex II

<sup>13</sup> By ‘speaking the same language’, we make reference to official recognized languages.

<sup>14</sup> That means that in the 85% of the cases, MRAs partners either speak the same language or share the same geographic region.

<sup>15</sup> [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>16</sup> Annex III

### 2.3 Mutual Recognition provisions in Preferential Treatment Agreements

Art. V of the GATS allows Members to conclude PTAs, if certain conditions have been respected. It is interesting to notice that, over the 59 PTAs notified to the WTO Secretariat, only 19 of those do not contain provisions about Mutual Recognition. In TABLE 5 – PTAs<sup>17</sup>, we made a distinction between agreements containing complete MRAs provisions (Y), agreements without MRAs provisions (N) and agreements where the parties agree to negotiate, in the future, on Mutual Recognitions. By looking at the table above mentioned, we can notice that only 4 PTAs contain specific commitments about Mutual Recognition (European Community, European Free Trade Agreement EFTA, India – Singapore and Korea – Singapore), and they have all been signed by parties sharing a geographic proximity.

Until the time of the conclusion of this paper, we do not know much about the implementation of the hortatory provisions contained in the PTAs above mentioned.

### 2.4 Can MRAs be Non Discriminatory?

As I have already mentioned in Chapter I, all MRAs must respect the general Non Discrimination principle, as for Art. II GATS. That means that they should remain open to the access of third parties, if the latter demonstrate that they are in a comparable situation to the one of the parties that originally agreed.

It seems that there is no doubt about the fact that it is up to the demandeur to prove that it is in a comparable situation. So, we can say that the demandeur has the burden of proof (BoP). It's up to the original parties of the Agreement to give to third parties adequate opportunities to demonstrate such a comparison. It is much more difficult to establish how long (and how hard) it takes to shift the burden of persuasion from the demandeur to the other parties.

Since the GATS is an incomplete contract and does not address the allocation of burden of proof explicitly, the better way to deal with this issue should be to check the case law of the Panel (P) and Appellate Body (AB) in this respect<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Annex IV

<sup>18</sup> It's been used the conditional, because no disputes took place in this field since 1995.

As far as we have just to deal with the interpretation of the treaty and with empirical evidence, we can infer that maybe there is not a general interest to extend MRAs. According to Mattoo (2000), '(...) if it is rationally expected that extending recognition to one member would eventually require extending it to many, then even the recognition of one may be deterred'. Such a conclusion doesn't seem to be desirable since, as the history of the European market integration teaches, Mutual Recognition can be a 'second best' option in order to push forward the trade in services to reach the goal of liberalization on a wider and global basis<sup>19</sup>.

While discussing the issue of 'comparability', we should keep in mind that almost all of the MRAs are *process based*. That means that a party recognizes that the process to become i. e. accountant, engineer or whatsoever in the other country is, at least, comparable to its own. And if, for example, a third party wants to enter the MRA and tries to show that it is in a comparable situation, it could be very hard for a judge not to find relevant differences in the quality of the studies, in their duration and so on and so forth. Even if the third party can prove that, notwithstanding these differences, the situations are still comparable, we should always keep in mind the fact that it is often the case of agreements signed between parties sharing strong cultural biases. As long as this is the case in the overwhelming majority of the agreements, to demonstrate a comparability for a third party (maybe a least developed country from a different region than the one shared by the parties) can become very hard.

Some could argue that, as long as they are under V GATS and not under VII GATS, the openness clause should not work. No questions arose about this issue neither in the negotiations rounds, nor in WTO practice. But since Art. V GATS states that the legal requirements to constitute a PTA are 'substantial sectoral coverage' and 'absence of discrimination', and does not mention recognition at all, we can reach a different conclusion: the openness clause still works, but there have been no disputes so far, because of the heaviness of the Burden of Proof. In other words, PTAs can provide legal shelter only for measures that are necessary for their establishment, and they can constitute an exception to the general Most Favoured Nation principle (MFN) only with regard to their necessary elements<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> See Nicolaïdis and Trachtman, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> The AB, in the Turkey – Textiles disputes, stated so. Albeit this is a GATT case, it is fair to conclude that a hypothetical GATS case could follow the same rationale.

Since the number of PTAs is constantly increasing, many scholars dealt with this issue. We can divide them into two main streams. The first one is composed by scholars who think that PTAs constitute a threat to market integration on a global ground and as a harm to the cause of free trade. The image of the ‘spaghetti bowl’ provided by Bhagwati (2002) is very famous, with the aim to describe the emerging PTAs’ landscape. It seems, according to his opinion, that the increasing number of preferential agreements is weakening the efforts of the other countries to strengthen the multilateral level of negotiations.

The second one has a kind of ‘second best approach’, since its scholars argue that PTAs can be viewed as steps towards a multilateral integration (Baldwin 2006)<sup>21</sup>. Both scholars seem to look at legal remedies to an eventual denial to a third party accession as a *chimeric issue*. Since PTAs are playing a major role in the evolution of market integration (at least at regional level), and since they are the most common means that USA and EU, the biggest commercial power in the world use, the possibility of a judicial review in order to ‘open the gates’ to third (and usually poorer) countries, seems very unrealistic, even in the future.

### **3. Conclusions**

The aim of this paper was to point out the distance that can stand between legal provisions about non-discriminatory MRAs and their concrete enforceability. While it seems, by looking at the legal provisions, that MRAs do not constitute an obstacle in the long road to the services market liberalization on a global scale, the reality shows exactly the opposite. It means that, albeit a formal legal rule about the necessity for all MRAs’ partners to keep the gates opened for an eventual third party’s accession, it is very hard for a third country to prove that it is in a comparable situation. Since the overwhelming majority of MRAs binds WTO Members with strong cultural and economic similarities, the lack of the ‘comparability criterion’ may occur very often. Just the strong relationship between the level of trust among the parties and their willing to negotiate and enter a MRA can be the explanation to the question about the possibility to keep it opened.

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<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed overview of these opinions, please see Fink (2008)

From a legal standpoint, another interesting question is about MR provisions in PTAs. The fact that Art. V GATS does not provide an openness clause such as Art. VII.4 does, can lead to the view that it does not work in this case. There is not a single case in the DS jurisprudence about such an issue, but it can be worth to recall what the AB stated in the *Turkey – Textiles* dispute. According to its view, PTAs can divert from the general ND principle only with reference to elements that are essential to such agreements. In the GATS, they are ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ and ‘absence of discrimination’ (like FTAs in the GATT). Since MRA-like provisions are not amongst these two categories, it seems that they are not a legal exception to the general ND principle. Nevertheless, the reality is a bit harder. The complete absence of litigation in this field, is the best proof to understand how heavy can be the burden of proof for a third party to demonstrate the comparability of its situation with the one of the original parties of the MRAs. We are not in the condition to foresee how the MRAs’ landscape is going to be in the future. It seems that there could be two scenarios, and we don’t have reasons to say which is more likely to be the real one.

The first scenario could be that of a progressive enlargement of the actual regional trade arenas. That means that MRAs can be viewed as stepping-stones towards global trade liberalization, just playing the role that they played in the European Union context, since a common basis of rules provided by the WTO system and the possibility to enlarge the market can make the bigger economic powers feel more secure while discovering new possibilities for commercial partnerships.

The lack of the political will to integrate the markets, can be seen as the bigger obstacle against such an evolution, contrary to what happened in the history of market integration in the EU.

The fact that the GATS system is still too young to ensure such certainties can be another explanation to the actual *impasse*, and can lead to an optimistic view for the future.

The other scenario would be that of a valorisation of MRAs as shelters against trade liberalisation. As we see in this particular historical period, the temptations for a new discovery of ‘protectionist’ policies are a concrete threat to the evolution of the global market. We have not enough arguments to foresee which of these two scenarios is the most likely to be the real one. There is still to understand if the burden of proof for the demandeur who wants to access a MRA



will remain as heavy (and not clear) as it is right now, or if future case-law will help the WTO legal system in this field.

We explicitly do not make reference to WTO multilateral negotiations, since the huge problems that the Doha Round is facing demonstrate how their success is more a *chimera* than a probable situation, at least in the next years.

So, for the moment, we cannot do anything except come to partial conclusions, waiting for something to move in the WTO legal framework. We should be well aware, however, that we could be waiting for Godot.

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- [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## **Annexes**

**Annex I: TABLE 2 – Subject**

Parties	Unknown Purpose	Unknown Purpose %	Both Academic and Professional	Both Academic and Professional %	Insurances	Insurances %	Credit Institutions	Credit Institutions %	Academic Purposes	Academic Purposes %	Professional Purposes	Professional Purposes %	Accountants	Accountants %	Engineers	Engineers %	Architects	Architects %
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Antigua and Barbuda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina	2	14	1	7	0	0	0	0	10	71	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	100	17	81	2	10	1	5
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahamas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbados	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belarus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	0	0	1	11	0	0	0	0	4	44	4	44	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	26	90	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	100	2	40	2	40	1	20
Cape Vert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	6	43	7	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50	1	50	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	22	67	9	27	0	0	0	0	0	0
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0	2	13	0	0	0	0	11	69	3	19	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	75	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	0

Parties	Unknown Purpose	Unknown Purpose %	Both Academic and Professional	Both Academic and Professional %	Insurances	Insurances %	Credit Institutions	Credit Institutions %	Academic Purposes	Academic Purposes %	Professional Purposes	Professional Purposes %	Accountants	Accountants %	Engineers	Engineers %	Architects	Architects %
Ecuador	0	0	1	10	0	0	0	0	6	60	3	30	0	0	0	0	0	0
El Salvador	0	0	3	30	0	0	0	0	3	30	4	40	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
European Commission	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	67	1	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	6	75	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haiti	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holy See	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Honduras	0	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	3	50	2	33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	100	1	33	2	67	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	100	2	50	2	50	0	0
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	1	50	0	0	1	50	0	0
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Korea	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lituania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0

Parties	Unknown Purpose	Unknown Purpose %	Both Academic and Professional	Both Academic and Professional %	Insurances	Insurances %	Credit Institutions	Credit Institutions %	Academic Purposes	Academic Purposes %	Professional Purposes	Professional Purposes %	Accountants	Accountants %	Engineers	Engineers %	Architects	Architects %
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	100	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands Antilles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	100	1	25	2	50	1	25
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	50	2	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Panama	0	0	1	20	0	0	0	0	4	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	1	25	1	25	0	0	0	0	1	25	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	0	0	1	10	0	0	0	0	5	50	4	40	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	100	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint Christopher and Nevis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint Lucia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	100	0	0	0	0
Slovak Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	100	1	33	2	67	0	0
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	50	3	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	2	50	0	0	0	0	2	50	0	0	0	0	0	0

Parties	Unknown Purpose	Unknown Purpose %	Both Academic and Professional	Both Academic and Professional %	Insurances	Insurances %	Credit Institutions	Credit Institutions %	Academic Purposes	Academic Purposes %	Professional Purposes	Professional Purposes %	Accountants	Accountants %	Engineers	Engineers %	Architects	Architects %
Taijikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	5	83	2	33	2	33	0	0
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uruguay	1	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	40	2	40	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	0	0	7	88	4	50	2	25	1	13
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	2	11	0	0	0	0	17	89	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	100	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



Parties	Surveyors	University Professions	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons	Lawyers	Patents Representatives	No Sector	Total
	Surveyors %	University Professions %	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons %	Lawyers %	Patents Representatives %	No Sector %	
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Antigua and Barbuda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	1	14
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Australia	1	5	0	0	0	0	21
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bahamas	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Barbados	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Belarus	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	4	9
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	2	29
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Cape Vert	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	7	14
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	9	33
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	3	16
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
Ecuador	0	1	10	0	0	2	10

Parties	Survivors	University Professions	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons	Lawyers	Patents Representatives	No Sector	Total
	Survivors %	University Professions %	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons %	Lawyers %	Patents Representatives %	No Sector %	
El Salvador	0	2	0	0	0	2	10
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
European Commission	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Haiti	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Holy See	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	2	6
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Iceland	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
Lituania	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Parties	Survivors	University Professions		Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons %		Lawyers	Lawyers %		Patents Representatives	Patents Representatives %		No Sector	No Sector %		Total
	Survivors %	University Professions	University Professions %		Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons %	Lawyers %		Patents Representatives %	No Sector		No Sector %					
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Netherlands Antilles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	4
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	40	0	0	10
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	1
Saint Cristopher and Nevis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Saint Lucia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Slovak Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
South Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Spain	0	0	2	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	0	0	6
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	4
Taijikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	0	1

Parties	Surveyors	University Professions	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons	Lawyers	Patents Representatives	No Sector	Total
	Surveyors %	University Professions %	Doctors, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons %	Lawyers %	Patents Representatives %	No Sector %	
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
UK	1	17	0	0	0	0	6
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	2	5
USA	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

## Annex II: TABLE 3 – Cultural Biases

Parties	Same Region (number)	Same Region (% over total MRAs notified)	Same Language	Same Language (% over total MRAs notified)	At least same region or same language	At least same region or same language (% over total MRAs notified)	Total
Angola	0	0	1	100	1	100	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Argentina	12	86	12	86	13	93	14
Armenia	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Australia	4	19	17	81	17	81	21
Azerbaijan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Bahamas	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Barbados	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Belarus	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Belgium	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Belize	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Bolivia	9	100	9	100	9	100	9
Brazil	21	72	3	10	22	76	29
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Canada	4	80	5	100	5	100	5
Cape Vert	0	0	1	100	1	100	1
Chile	13	93	12	86	14	100	14
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Colombia	23	70	21	64	24	73	33
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Costa Rica	14	88	12	75	14	88	16
Cuba	3	100	3	100	3	100	3
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dominica	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Dominican Republic	4	100	4	100	4	100	4
Ecuador	10	100	9	90	10	100	10
El Salvador	8	80	8	80	10	100	10
Estonia	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
European Commission	2	100	2	100	2	100	2
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Georgia	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Grenada	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Guatemala	8	100	8	100	8	100	8
Guyana	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Haiti	3	100	2	67	3	100	3
Holy See	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Honduras	6	100	6	100	6	100	6
Hong Kong	0	0	3	100	3	100	3
Iceland	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Iran	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Ireland	0	0	4	100	4	100	4
Jamaica	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Kazakhstan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Kyrgyzstan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Latvia	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Liechtenstein	3	100	2	67	3	100	3

Parties	Same Region (number)	Same Region (% over total MRAs notified)	Same Language	Same Language (% over total MRAs notified)	At least same region or same language	At least same region or same language (% over total MRAs notified)	Total
Lituania	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Luxembourg	1	100	1	100	2	200	1
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mexico	3	100	3	100	3	100	3
Moldova	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Netherlands Antilles	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
New Zealand	4	100	4	100	4	100	4
Nicaragua	4	100	4	100	2	50	4
Norway	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Panama	5	100	4	80	5	100	5
Paraguay	4	100	4	100	4	100	4
Peru	10	100	9	90	10	100	10
Philippines	0	0	1	100	1	100	1
Portugal	0	0	1	50	1	50	2
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Saint Christopher and Nevis	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Saint Lucia	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1	100	1	100	1	100	1
Singapore	0	0	1	100	1	100	1
Slovak Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
South Africa	0	0	3	100	3	100	3
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Spain	0	0	6	100	6	100	6
Suriname	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Switzerland	4	100	4	100	4	100	4
Taijikistan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Trinidad and Tobago	2	100	0	0	2	100	2
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkmenistan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
UK	0	0	5	83	5	83	6
Ukraine	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Uruguay	5	100	5	100	5	100	5
USA	7	88	2	25	7	88	8
Uzbekistan	1	100	0	0	1	100	1
Venezuela	18	95	14	74	18	95	19
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

**Annex III: TABLE 4 – Level of Income**

Parties	G2 - G2	G2 - HIC	G2 - LIC	G2 - LDC	G2 - UMC	G2 - LMC	HIC - HIC	HIC - LIC	HIC - UMC	HIC - LMC	UMC - UMC	LMC - LMC	UMC - LMC	LIC - LIC	UMC - LIC	LMC - LIC
Argentina - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Argentina - Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina - Holy See	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina - Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Argentina - Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Argentina - Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina - Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Armenia - Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Australia - Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - South Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Usa	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Usa	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - USA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia - Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Cape Vert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Congo Dem. Rep.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Brazil - Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Haiti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Brazil - Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Brazil - Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Brazil - Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Parties	G2 - G2	G2 - HIC	G2 - LIC	G2 - LDC	G2 - UMC	G2 - LMC	HIC - HIC	HIC - LIC	HIC - UMC	HIC - LMC	UMC - UMC	LMC - LMC	UMC - LMC	LIC - LIC	UMC - LIC	LMC - LIC
Chile - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Chile - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Chile - Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Chile - Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile - Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Slovak Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Soviet Union (?)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia - Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Soviet Union (?)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
EC - Switzerland	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EC - Switzerland	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador - Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
El Salvador - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
El Salvador - Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
El Salvador - Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
El Salvador - Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
El Salvador - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Germany - Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany - Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany - USA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala - Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Switzerland - Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland - Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



Parties	G2 - G2	G2 - HIC	G2 - LIC	G2 - LDC	G2 - UMC	G2 - LMC	HIC - HIC	HIC - LIC	HIC - UMC	HIC - LMC	UMC - UMC	LMC - LMC	UMC - LMC	LIC - LIC	UMC - LIC	LMC - LIC
Usa - Canada	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Usa - Canada	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Venezuela - Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Venezuela - Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Venezuela - Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela - Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total (over 106)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>

## Annex IV: TABLE 5 - PTAs

Parties	Recognition	Other	Date of entry into force
Japan - Thailand	Other	a party 'may recognize', art. 118	2007
Chile - Japan	Other	a party 'may recognize', art. 113	2007
Trans - Pacific strategic economic partnership (Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore, New Zealand)	Other	hortatory, art. 12	2006
India - Singapore	Y		2005
Panama - Singapore	n		2006
US - Bahrein	Other	The Parties shall encourage	2006
Costa Rica - Mexico	Other	The Parties shall encourage	1995
Efta - Korea	Other	The Parties shall encourage (cannot find the annexes, there should be one on mutual recognition...)	2006
Japan - Malaysia	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2006
Jordan - Singapore	N		2005
Guatemala - Mexico	N		2001
Honduras - Mexico	N		2001
El Salvador - Mexico	N		2001
Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2006
Korea - Singapore	Y	Korea recognizes 2 Singapore Universities; Singapore recognizes 20 Korea Universities (annex 9D)	2006
EC	Y		1958
Us - Morocco	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2006
Thailand - New Zealand	N		2005
Mexico - Nicaragua	N		1998
EC - Chile	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2003
Japan - Mexico	Other	hortatory, art. 104	2005
Panama - El Salvador (Central America)	Other	the parties agree to negotiate on mutual recognition of higher education diplomas - Annex 11.13	2003
Thailand - Australia	Other	a party may recognize... art. 808, cannot find the annex	2005
Us - Australia	Other	The Parties shall encourage annex 10 - A	2005
EFTA - Chile	Other	The Parties shall encourage - art 29	2004
Korea - Chile	N		2004
Chile - El Salvador (Central America)	N		2002
China - Macao	N		2004
China - Hong Kong	N		2004
Us - Singapore	Other	the parties shall encourage	2004
Us - Chile	Other	The Parties shall encourage	2004
Singapore - Australia	Other	The Parties shall encourage	2003
New Zealand - Singapore	Other	The Parties shall encourage	2001
<b>Parties</b>	<b>Recognition</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Date of entry into force</b>
EFTA - Mexico	Other	The Parties shall encourage	2001
Chile - Mexico	N		1999
EFTA - Singapore	N		2003
EC - Mexico	N		2000

Chile - Costa Rica (Central America)	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2002
Japan - Singapore	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2002
Us - Jordan	N		2001
Canada - Chile	Other	the parties agree to foster...	1997
NAFTA	N	the parties agree to foster...	1994
Australia - Chile	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2009
Japan - Indonesia	N		2008
Us - Peru	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2009
Us - Oman	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2009
Panama - Chile	Other	the parties agree to foster...	2008
China - Singapore	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2009
Iceland - Faroe Islands	N		2006
Brunei Darussalam - Japan	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2008
EC - CARIFORUM States EPA	N		2008
Japan - Philippines	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2008
MERCOSUR	Other	possibility to recognize...	2005
		the parties shall establish common	
CARICOM	Other	standard to recognize...	1997
EFTA	Y		2002
EEA	N		1994
Australia - New Zealand	N		1989
ASEAN - China	Other		2007
Pakistan - Malaysia	Other	a party 'may recognize'	2008